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 Presentation of the Question 
 It is widely known that at least three of the major world religions—Christianity, Islam, 
and (more controversially) Judaism—embrace the theory of bodily resurrection, or an event in 
which a person or people are brought back to embodied life after death. But is this theory 
compatible with materialism, or the philosophical doctrine that nothing exists except matter and 
its movements and modifications? In other words, if my “self” is purely physical (e.g. identical 
with or constituted by my body), could my unique and particular “self” come to exist again on 
Earth after my death? The answer to this question is hotly debated; it is this debate, situated at 
the crossroads of philosophy and Christian theology, on which my thesis will focus.  
An Introduction to Materialism and its Problems 
Before we dive into theories of how bodily resurrection might be compatible with 
materialism, we must first understand what materialism and bodily resurrection entail. We will 
begin by examining materialism, which is the philosophical theory that nothing exists except 
matter and its movements and modifications, that selves contain only fundamentally physical 
parts. This theory exists in opposition to idealism, which claims that only ideas/perceptions and 
nonphysical minds exist (and that therefore I am identical with my fundamentally non-material 
mind), and dualism, one version of which claims that I am identical to my non-material mind, 
though I also “have” a physical body. So another way to phrase my thesis topic is: if my “self” is 
identical with or constituted by my body and not by anything fundamentally non-physical, could 
my unique and particular “self” come to exist and live again after my death?  
 Materialism is favored by the majority of modern philosophers, yet poses a perhaps 
insurmountable problem for the doctrine of bodily resurrection. For some of the most central 
issues that must be addressed in this or any survival theory are the questions of what constitutes 
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personal identity, and how this personal identity can persist through drastic change (in this case, 
through the temporal gap constituted by death and the change from pre-mortem to post-
resurrection existence).  
This problem is unique to materialists; for both idealists and dualists, bodily resurrection 
does not pose much of an issue, because in these theories, the self is either entirely or largely a 
fundamentally non-physical mind or soul and can therefore exist independently of the body—so 
when a person is resurrected, all that is needed is for the mind or soul to be re-united with the 
body; the self that persists through the death of the body has remained in existence, and has 
retained its personal identity; there is no problematic gap of temporal nonexistence during the 
body’s death. But with materialism, the self is purely physical (i.e., is identical with or 
constituted by the body), and bodies do go out of existence when they decompose, are cremated, 
are eaten, etc. In order to show that bodily resurrection is compatible with materialism, the 
materialist/resurrection theorist must therefore address this key issue of how personal identity is 
to survive the temporal gap of death. This will be explored by several authors investigated in this 
thesis paper. 
The Question, Complicated 
Furthermore, it seems that the embodied self that is resurrected must be numerically 
identical with the embodied self that previously died. In other words, the pre-mortem and post-
resurrection bodies cannot be merely qualitatively identical—that is, they cannot merely look 
identical, be composed identically, and yet be distinct. They must also be numerically identical—
that is, the body that died must be the same exact body that was resurrected. For if the bodies 
were not numerically identical, then several problems would arise. For example, a self that could 
be equated with two qualitatively identical but numerically distinct bodies is logically impossible 
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since it would violate Leibniz’s Law. Also known as the Identity of Indiscernibles, this law of 
logic states that no two distinct things exactly resemble each other—so if two bodies are 
qualitatively identical, they must be numerically identical. It becomes illogical, then, that bodily 
resurrection could entail a self living on via the creation of a new body that is qualitatively 
identical to, but numerically distinct from, the body that died. If the doctrine of bodily 
resurrection is to hold, it seems that we must discover a way in which the same body that dies is 
the one that is resurrected. This paradoxical puzzle of how to align identity with process is a 
major problem for materialist views of bodily resurrection, and is one of the main issues on 
which this thesis paper will focus. 
Reconstitution Views and their Problems 
One way in which philosophers have dealt with this problem is to take a reconstitution 
view of bodily resurrection. There are at least two different versions of this view. The older 
version, put forward by such theologians as Methodius of Olympus, is to deny any bodily change 
in terms of replacement of particles, even throughout life; while appearance changes, “every 
particle of the body subsists throughout life, never nourished or excreted or in any way invaded 
or altered” (Bynum, 69). In this view, a metaphor of a statue or vessel is often used; our particles 
are specific and unchanging, and resurrection entails God reconstructing us as such. This version 
of the reconstitution view has been rejected with modern science, as we now are certain that real 
bodily change and process, real death and new generation of bodily matter, is a key part of life. 
Another version of the reconstitution view that holds more promise is also known as the 
Aristotelian view of resurrection and is one in which God gathers up the particles that formed the 
body at the moment of death and reassembles them so as to create a complete post-resurrection 
body composed of all the same particles in the same way as the original, pre-mortem body. But 
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this view is faced with such problems that must be overcome as the cannibalism problem and the 
problem of fission or annihilation.  
The cannibalism problem asks how it is possible for our bodies to be reassembled, given 
that the atoms that make up our bodies eventually leave and are transformed into new kinds of 
matter as our bodies disintegrate or are burned, and become parts of other beings—as when a 
cannibal eats another human or when a man receives a new organ from an organ donor. At this 
point, whose atoms are whose? How can both myself and the person who took some of my atoms 
into her own body be resurrected into two whole people when we share the matter that has made 
up both of our bodies at the moment of both of our deaths? Philosophers have proposed various 
solutions to this problem; these approaches will be explored throughout later parts of this thesis 
paper. 
But even if the problem of cannibalism can be solved, the problem of fission or 
annihilation proposed by Yuval Avnur (discussion, Oct. 10, 2016) remains. Avnur points out that 
matter can be destroyed,  partially or totally—such as when it is converted into energy and 
smaller pieces of matter in fission, or completely annihilated and turned to pure energy when 
matter meets antimatter. The problem then is how even God could possibly locate this energy 
that used to be my body and reconvert that same energy into the same matter my pre-mortem 
body was made of at the time of my death. For this is what is needed for this version of the 
reconstitution view of bodily resurrection. This poses a major challenge for the view of bodily 
resurrection itself, given our assumption of materialism. 
Temporal Gaps and Personal Identity 
So, then, besides the issue of how bodies could be perfectly reconstituted in order to 
regain numerical identity, given challenges such as the cannibalism problem and the problem of 
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fission or annihilation, there is the question of how a body that has gone out of and back into 
existence and life could possibly have retained the personal identity of the self that it constitutes. 
After all, reconstituting my body how it was at the moment of death cannot be enough, or else 
my corpse would not be a corpse; I simply would have never died. So there must be some other 
element to retaining personal identity over the spatiotemporal gap of death. In other words, to 
find the doctrine of bodily resurrection compatible with materialism, we must discover a way in 
which God could reconstitute bodies in such a way that the living body that has since died is 
numerically identical with the body that has been resurrected, given the obstacle of death. 
An answer to the question of the compatibility of bodily resurrection with materialism 
has the capability to make or break the entire doctrine. For if materialism is true (which I will 
assume in my thesis, as the question is about compatibility, not truth) and incompatible with 
resurrection, the entire doctrine would fall. But if materialism is true and compatible with the 
doctrine of bodily resurrection, the doctrine will have gained substantial support.  
The Christian Doctrine of Bodily Resurrection 
We now ought to examine what the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection entails. Most 
importantly, it entails resurrection with one’s selfsame body they had prior to death (Davis, 
Death and Afterlife, 125). While there is debate regarding whether or not this selfsame body 
undergoes change between death and resurrection—for example, there is debate between 
physicalists and spiritualists regarding the nature of Jesus’ resurrection body (Bynum, 5), which, 
in Christian doctrine, is the model for the future resurrection bodies of us all (1 Corinthians 
15.12-19)—it is clear that throughout the Bible, there is emphasis on a bodily resurrection. For 
instance, in Luke 24.36-44, Jesus appears to the Prophets and asks, “Why are you troubled, and 
why do doubts rise in your minds? Look at my hands and my feet. It is I myself! Touch me and 
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see; a ghost does not have flesh and bones, as you see I have.” Jesus then eats fish in their 
presence, presumably in order to prove that his resurrection body was, in fact, material. 
Besides making it clear that Jesus had some kind of resurrection body, the New 
Testament focuses not on whether we will have resurrection bodies, but on what these bodies 
will be like. While some theologians have viewed our bodies as urns or statues which are 
resurrected by re-assemblage (Bynum, 8), others adhere to Paul’s famed seed metaphor in 1 
Corinthians 15 of a bodily resurrection that entails physical change with a spiritual (but 
nonetheless material) aspect:  
But someone will ask, “How are the dead raised? With what kind of body will they 
come?” How foolish! What you sow does not come to life unless it dies. When you sow, 
you do not plant the body that will be, but just a seed, perhaps of wheat or of something 
else. But God gives it a body as he has determined, and to each kind of seed he gives its 
own body.  
So will it be with the resurrection of the dead. The body that is sown is perishable, 
it is raised imperishable; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in 
weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. 
[…] we will all be changed—in a flash, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last 
trumpet. […] For the perishable must clothe itself with the imperishable, and the mortal 
with immortality. (1 Corinthians 15.35-54) 
 
 In other words, the New Testament presents the spiritual resurrection body as physically 
and spatiotemporally contiguous with the pre-mortem body; it is the selfsame body, purified, 
glorified, and transformed by God (although in exactly what ways is debated) so as to be fit to 
leave earth for heaven. In the Pauline seed metaphor, the pre-mortem body is the seed, and what 
develops and grows from this seed is the spiritual body. So we see that there is material change, 
then—unlike in the strict reconstitution view of bodily resurrection explored earlier—but the 
resurrection body is nevertheless contiguous in all ways with the pre-mortem body.  
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Importantly, philosophers who argue for the compatibility of bodily resurrection with 
materialism emphasize this purely material nature of said “spiritual body.” Stephen T. Davis 
says: 
The term ‘spiritual body’ might be misleading; it should not be taken as a denial of 
corporeality or as a last-minute capitulation to some version of the immortality of the soul 
as opposed to bodily resurrection. By this term Paul means not a body whose stuff or 
matter is spiritual (whatever that might mean) or an immaterial existence of some sort; 
rather he means a body that is fully obedient to and dominant by the Holy Spirit. […] 
What enters the kingdom of heaven […] is not this present weak and mortal body of flesh 
and blood but the new glorified body. This new body is a physical body (Paul’s use of the 
word soma implies as much), and is materially related to the old body (taking seriously 
Paul’s simile of the seed), but is a body transformed in such ways as make it fit to live in 
God’s presence. If by the term ‘physical object’ we mean an entity that has spatio-
temporal location and is capable of being empirically measured, tested, or observed in 
some sense, then […] the new body […] is a physical object. (Davis, Death and Afterlife, 
126)   
 
Origen of Alexandria 
 
As we have seen, the idea of bodily change when one identifies self with physical body 
(as is the case in materialism) is not without problems or paradox. For, again, if I am identical 
with my body that died, there arises the question of how I could be said to be a “new,” 
transformed body after resurrection, different from the original in significant ways—even if this 
body is contiguous with the original, pre-mortem one. Some criteria that can account for personal 
identity through physical change—in this case, a physical change as drastic as death and rebirth 
through transformation—is required. According to Bynum, the issue is “a fundamental 
contradiction between identity and change,” (Bynum, 62) that can be outlined as follows: 
There must be something that rises; there is no resurrection without identity. We know 
we are body; therefore body must rise. But there must be process and transformation as 
well, because the risen body must be radically changed. Unless something can change 
and still be the same thing, there can be no rising to glory of the corpse that has gone 




The first theologian to provide a plausible solution to this paradox of how identity can 
survive through process was Origen of Alexandria in the third century AD (Bynum, 63). Origen 
was unique in that he “accounted for identity through dynamic process and built radical change 
into resurrection” (Bynum, 63). This dynamism in his influential account included process 
throughout life, transition from life to death, and a transformation from death to afterlife that 
maps nicely onto the Pauline seed metaphor of 1 Corinthians 15. 
Origen recognized the natural process of material change in our bodies so acutely that he 
clearly stated that because of natural processes such as eating, excreting, etc., 
[…] the material substratum [of the body] is never the same. For this reason, river is not a 
bad name for the body since, strictly speaking, the initial substratum in our bodies is 
perhaps not the same for even two days. (Bynum, 64) 
 
Further, Origen wondered, 
Even if the bits of flesh present at the moment of death could survive, why would God 
arbitrarily decide to reanimate those bits as opposed to all the others that have flowed 
through the body between childhood and old age?” (Bynum, 65). 
 
What must remain the same through change and therefore accounts for our personal 
identity, according to Origen, is not matter, but our material form or eidos. According to Bynum,  
This eidos is a combination of Platonic form, or plan, with Stoic seminal reason (an 
internal principle of growth or development). A pattern that organizes the flux of matter 
and yet has its own inherent capacity for growth, it is (although I introduce the modern 
analogy with extreme hesitation) a bit like a genetic code. (Bynum, 66) 
 
In other words, personal identity is in the form, and the form also has an inherent 
organizational code. So the particles don’t matter for identity; it’s the form and its inherent 
organization that are key to body and therefore self. 
To extend Origen’s metaphor of person as river, then, the eidos is the shape of the river 
along with the capacity for the river’s shape to change over time (although the river would still 
be recognizable as and formally contiguous with the same river, just as Jesus was changed yet 
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recognized after his resurrection, according to Luke 24). Further, this is really what we mean 
when we say “river,” as we are not referring to the particular water molecules flowing through 
the form of the river—although it is necessary that there are water particles. In the same way, 
matter in general is a necessary condition of body, but the particular particles of matter are 
inconsequential; it is the form and its own organizational code which makes my body my body—
and therefore (on a strict materialist view of persons) me, me. 
Because form is so important, Origen adds that accordingly, the “corporeal quality” of 
persons (such as scars, skin blemishes, etc.) also remains the same, even in our glorified 
resurrection bodies (Bynum, 64). So even though our bodies change daily in life due to process 
and adaptation, from life to death, and from death to afterlife, they remain recognizable; Origen 
will look in the afterlife largely as he did in life and in death, according to his view. 
According to Origen’s account, while our form persists from life to death to afterlife, we 
will have a “spiritual and luminous” resurrection body of new, pure particles in heaven (Bynum, 
64). This is because our earthly bodies of flux are not fit to live in the environment of heaven and 
so cannot rise; heaven requires bodies that are more crystalline, just as fish require gills to live 
underwater (Bynam quoting Origen, 65). Further, since the resurrection body will lack all of the 
matter it was composed of before, this solves the problem of the arbitrariness of God choosing 
which past particles to use to reconstitute us in the resurrection, as well as the problem of 
cannibalism; all particles for each resurrection body are new, and holy. Yet the body and thus 
person retain identity because, 
The previous form does not disappear, even if its transition to the more glorious [state] 
occurs […] [A]lthough the form is saved, we are going to put away nearly [every] earthly 
quality in the resurrection … [for] “flesh and blood cannot inherit [the] kingdom…” (1 
Corinthians 15.50). Similarly, for the saint there will indeed be [a body] preserved by him 
who once endued the flesh with form, but [there will] no longer [be] flesh; yet the very 
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thing which was once being characterized in the flesh will be characterized in the 
spiritual body. (Bynum quoting Origen, 65-66) 
 
 Again, the form is intact but the earthly matter is replaced with spiritual—but 
nevertheless physical—matter so that the body is capable of rising from earth to heaven. Thus is 
Origen’s solution to the problem of retaining personal identity while embracing a pre-mortem 
body of change and a transformation from pre-mortem to resurrection body. 
Methodius of Olympus 
Origen’s account was not without contenders, and Methodius of Olympus was one of 
Origen’s most outspoken critics. Their fundamental difference lay in the fact that while Origen 
wanted to find a way to incorporate flux into the body, Methodius feared and denied bodily 
change almost altogether. He denied that digestion really occurs, claiming instead that 
“nutriment replaces only body fluids not bones, sinews, or flesh,” much as water flows through a 
canal (Bynum, 71). Further, these fluids that undergo change via digestion are “superfluities, not 
substance” (Bynum, 71). So while Methodius allowed for change to inessential features of our 
embodiment in life, he denied transformation or replacement of particles, in life, in death, in the 
afterlife, and in the transitions in between. 
Methodius recognized that Origen’s account sacrifices material continuity for identity 
through change, and was not willing to sacrifice this aspect of what Methodius believed to be a 
key part of the integrity of our material bodies (Bynum, 70). Methodius wanted an account not of 
identity through drastic change—since he denied real change—but an account of reassembly 
through reconstruction, not transformation. For Methodius, the ultimate question was not how to 
maintain identity, but was about “physicality: how will every particle of our bodies be saved?” 
(Bynum, 68). Thus, while Origen favored the organic symbolism of the Pauline seed metaphor, 
Methodius described the body as 
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[…] a stone temple within which the tree of sin is growing. In death, the temple falls; the 
tree is rooted out. Then in resurrection the exact stones are reconstructed in the exact 
shape that subsisted before. What grows and changes here is sinister, needing to be 
curtailed or destroyed; that which is salvageable is that—and only that—which persists 
unchanged. (Bynum, 70)  
 
It is not clear what the tree symbolizes here, although it is plausible that the tree is the 
changing fluids within our bodies. Since Methodius feared change and viewed it as unclean, his 
account of the resurrection banished this aspect of our bodies from heaven; our selfsame particles 
are used to reconstitute our bodies, but the changeable fluids are left out altogether. This is an 
unproblematic development, since the fluids were said to be superfluous and completely 
inessential to our bodies.  
Another key point within the metaphor of the rebuilt temple is that the stones (material 
particles) used to rebuild the temple (body) in the resurrection are the exact stones (material 
particles) in the original structure (body). This highlights Methodius’s unwillingness to sacrifice 
the material continuity of body-composing particles to account for change; for Methodius, “both 
material continuity and complete bodily integrity are necessary for resurrection” (Bynum, 71). 
While Origen is satisfied with bodily continuity via the eidos or form, Methodius demands 
material continuity for the maintenance and identity of body. This is the fundamental 
disagreement between the two materialist points of view championed by Origen and Methodius. 
Methodius did respond directly to Origen as well, although he seems to have 
misinterpreted Origen’s concept of eidos, for his response misses the mark. Methodius viewed 
the eidos “as external appearance or shape (that is, a waterskin into and out of which matter 
flows)” (Bynum, 69). Since Origen claimed the eidos is static and Methodius interpreted it as 
external appearance, Methodius argued against Origen by pointing out that external appearance 
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does in fact change, and so the eidos cannot be the constant; identity of body must therefore be 
found in the matter itself. 
However, Origen did agree that external appearance changes (as when a baby grows into 
an adult), so Methodius’s response fails. For Origen viewed the eidos not as a waterskin that 
does not change, but as a river that has an inherent and coded capacity for formally contiguous 
and recognizable change. So Origen seems to have the upper hand in the debate, since his 
account withstands Methodius’s main contention and acknowledges the scientific fact of 
significant material, bodily change that Methodius denied. 
More Questions for Origen 
This is not to say that Origen’s account is without problems. As we have seen, to accept 
Origen’s account, one must accept sacrificing “material continuity for the sake of identity” and 
“integrity of bodily structure for the sake of transformation” (Bynum, 68). Further, questions 
arise regarding Origen’s claim that such “corporeal qualities” as scars and skin blemishes 
become part of the eidos and so are maintained in our resurrection bodies (Bynum, 64). While 
some surface changes are allowed in the eidos since the eidos contains an “internal principle of 
growth and development” (Bynum, 66), it is unclear what is to become of unnatural alterations to 
the body that are externally imposed, such as amputations, reconstructive or plastic surgery, 
tattoos, and scars received from external forces (as when one accidentally cuts oneself when 
chopping carrots). For while the definition of eidos allows for internal development, the previous 
examples are not internally developed, but are all due to external factors. Surely it was not 
programmed in my eidos that I would be cut above the eye at a young age, resulting in a small 
scar… So then why is this scar supposedly central enough to my eidos to come with me into the 
afterlife, as a necessary feature of my resurrection body? Origenists must either answer this 
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question or relinquish the claim that all corporeal qualities are central enough to be necessarily 
present in our glorified resurrection bodies. 
 A peripheral contention to be had with Origen lies in his suggestion “that we will lose all 
memory of the relationships of earth” (Bynum, 67). For if a person loses all memory of her life 
on earth, why should she care that she is resurrected? A key intuition is that we care about living 
on because we do not want to lose our memories and relationships. And it is hard to say who we 
would really be without our experiences, from a phenomenological perspective. With this in 
mind, it is difficult to think how one might be motivated to become an Origenist, despite the fact 
that it makes sense—in the abstract—of both materialism and scripture. For after all, Origen’s 
account of the resurrection takes our memory, and with it, a key reason for wanting to be 
resurrected in the first place. Of course, an Origenist could respond that the reward is being in 
the presence of God, and that this is enough. Points of view will differ on whether or not this is 
indeed enough, but this has little to do with the plausibility of Origen’s account of bodily 
resurrection. And it seems to me that Origen’s materialist account, in general, is quite plausible 
indeed. 
Peter van Inwagen 
 In The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics, Peter van 
Inwagen provides evidence for rejecting the Aristotelian or reassembly/reconstruction view of 
the resurrection, and in its stead presents his own “just-so story” of the resurrection, a story 
which has come to be known as the simulacrum model of resurrection. In the following pages, 
we will come to know van Inwagen’s stance regarding the criterion of personal identity, as well 
as how this criterion is violated in the reassembly view of the resurrection. We will then explore 
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three arguments against this theory, before being introduced to the simulacrum model of 
resurrection. 
 Van Inwagen’s criterion of personal identity is that, 
the atoms of which I am composed occupy at each instance the positions they do because 
of the operations of certain processes within me (those processes that, taken collectively, 
constitute my being alive) (van Inwagen, 47, emphasis mine). 
 
In other words, Person X (at time A) is identical with Person Y (at time B) if and only if they are 
connected by a causal chain “of the operation of the natural processes that, taken collectively, 
were the life of that man” (van Inwagen, 47).  
 The problem for van Inwagen, then, regarding the Resurrection, is not that there is no 
criterion for personal identity, but that given the criterion of personal identity he believes does 
exist (that of the causal chain of life processes within the body), this criterion “would, of 
necessity, yield the result that many men who have died in our own lifetime and earlier will not 
be found among those who live after the Last Day” (van Inwagen, 45, emphasis in original). This 
is because given this criterion of personal identity, to be bodily resurrected would require that 
one’s body be not entirely or significantly destroyed. This is because 
[…] if a man does not simply die but is totally destroyed (as in the case of cremation) 
then he can never be reconstituted, for the causal chain has been irrevocably broken. If 
God collects the atoms that used to constitute that man and ‘reassembles’ them, they will 
occupy the positions relative to one another they occupy because of God’s miracle and 
not because of the operation of the natural processes that, taken collectively, were the life 
of that man. (van Inwagen, 47, emphasis in original). 
 
However, the fact is that many bodies throughout history have been significantly 
destroyed to the point where atoms which previously occupied positions because of the processes 
they underwent in life are either destroyed or no longer occupy these positions, due to bodily 
decay, cannibalism, cremation, or any other number of posthumous physical reasons. And this is 
problematic because Christians interpret the Bible to promise life after death to all good 
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Christians—presumably including ones that were fed to the lions or significantly bodily altered 
or destroyed in other ways in Ancient Rome or other times. But with van Inwagen’s criterion of 
personal identity—which he believes is correct—these people could not be resurrected. So we 
find ourselves at odds with Christian doctrine. 
 But why doesn’t the Aristotelian story solve the problem of Christian bodily resurrection? 
In van Inwagen’s words, the Aristotelian story is as follows: 
God collects the atoms that once composed a certain man and restores them to the 
positions they occupied relative to one another when that man was alive; thereby […] 
God restores the man himself. (van Inwagen, 47) 
 
This story is insufficient given van Inwagen’s criterion of personal identity, since in the 
Aristotelian story, the atoms of the post-mortem body are put into place by God, not by the 
natural processes of life. 
 Van Inwagen clarifies this point by analogy to a manuscript. In his analogy, Saint 
Augustine’s manuscript is burned and then recreated by God. The monks, analogously taking 
after the Aristotelian story of resurrection, may say that this document recreated by God is the 
same manuscript as the one that Saint Augustine originally created. But van Inwagen objects that 
it’s not the same, since the copy was not a part of the fabric of the world when Augustine lived. 
And, more importantly, the ink in the recreated document was put there by God, and not by 
Augustine. In this story, the manuscript is analogous to a human body, and the ink is analogous 
to the atoms in the body. So, we see more clearly that because this Aristotelian theory of 
resurrection violates van Inwagen’s criterion of personal identity, the former is defective within 
the framework of van Inwagen’s metaphysics. 
 Van Inwagen then provides three further arguments against the Aristotelian account of 
the resurrection that don’t depend on the above analogy. The first two of these are ad hominem 
 18 
 
arguments directed against Christians who take the Aristotelian view of the Resurrection, and the 
third shows that the Aristotelian theory has an impossible consequence. 
 The first of these arguments begins by pointing to the Christian doctrine that says that 
wicked men cannot hope to escape God’s wrath, even in death. Van Inwagen then points to the 
scientific fact that atoms can, in fact, be destroyed. So, it seems to van Inwagen, wicked men 
could evade the wrath of God by ensuring that all his “building blocks” were destroyed in such a 
way. So, concludes this first argument, either “the nature of the ultimate constituents of matter is 
different from what it appears to be,” or “the ‘Aristotelian’ theory is inimical to a central point of 
Christian theology” (van Inwagen, 48). 
 Van Inwagen’s second argument also has implications for this Christian theological point 
that wicked men cannot escape the wrath of God. For the cannibalism problem poses a serious 
threat to this doctrine. The cannibalism problem is, in short, that “we may be composed of atoms 
that have been parts of other people at some time in the past” (van Inwagen, 48). If the 
Aristotelian theory of resurrection is true, the argument continues, this could lead to some 
confusion regarding who exactly is resurrected when the trumpet sounds. For example, if a 
member of the Donner Party—lets call him Sam—ate another member of the Donner Party to 
survive—let’s call him Alex—thereby incorporating Alex’s body into his own, and then died of 
the elements himself, when the trumpet sounds, will both Alex and Sam be resurrected? Or will 
only Alex be resurrected, Sam having more or less “become” Alex in an important way by eating 
him? Van Inwagen seems to take the latter view, declaring that “a wicked man who had read his 
Aquinas might hope to escape punishment in the age to become by becoming a life-long 
cannibal” (van Inwagen, 48). “But again,” continues van Inwagen, “the possibility of such a hope 
cannot be admitted by any Christian” (van Inwagen, 48). So, either we must solve the 
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cannibalism problem differently than van Inwagen has, or we must admit that the Aristotelian 
theory of the Resurrection is at odds with a central tenet of Christian theology. 
 Finally, the third argument relies on the principle that two things existing in space at one 
time, whether identical or not, are not one and the same thing. Van Inwagen points out that it is 
possible that no atoms he had when he was ten years old are in his body now. But on Aristotelian 
theory, God could recreate him from his ten-year-old self’s atoms, while van Inwagen still lives. 
In this example, van Inwagen states, both could truly say that they are van Inwagen. But because 
this is conceptually impossible, we see that the Aristotelian theory of Resurrection must be 
flawed. 
 Since for van Inwagen, only an Aristotelian theory of resurrection seems plausible, but is 
conceptually impossible, “[…] it is absolutely impossible, even as an accomplishment of God, 
that a man who has been burned to ashes or been eaten by worms should ever live again” (van 
Inwagen, 48). This means that for the doctrines of bodily resurrection and of all good Christians 
being sent to Heaven and of no wicked man being able to escape the wrath of God to be true, it 
must be the case that no bodies have actually been destroyed, against all appearances to the 
contrary. 
 Thus is the basis for van Inwagen’s simulacrum theory of resurrection. The theory can be 
summarized as follows: 
Perhaps at the moment of each man’s death, God removes his corpse and replaces it with 
a simulacrum, which is what is burned or rots. Or perhaps God is not quite so wholesale 
as this: Perhaps he removes for “safe-keeping” only the “core person”—the brain and 
central nervous system—or even some special part of it. These are details. (van Inwagen, 
49) 
 
Van Inwagen is careful to state that this simulacrum theory of resurrection is a “just-so story”—
that is, one that serves to establish a possibility, but probably is not true. But, adds van Inwagen, 
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[…] even if the story is not true, even if it gets the ‘mechanism’ of Resurrection wrong, it 
nevertheless is true—in a way. That is, I am inclined to think that even if the story is 
wrong about the specifics of the Resurrection, the Resurrection-in-the-story […] 
nevertheless shares some important but very abstract feature of the real thing. My 
inclination is to believe that God will somehow—in the way I have imagined or in some 
way I lack the conceptual resources to imagine, “in this way or some other”—; preserve a 
remnant of each person […], which will be sown in corruption and raised in incorruption. 
(van Inwagen, 51, emphasis in original) 
Questions for van Inwagen 
 First, it is unclear exactly why van Inwagen holds the theory of the criterion of personal 
identity that he does; he never addresses this point, even indirectly. And this is an important 
omission, since van Inwagen’s entire objection to the Aristotelian theory of reconstitution 
revolves around it not meeting this criterion of personal identity [as a reminder, his criterion is 
that “the atoms of which I am composed occupy at each instance the positions they do because of 
the operations of certain processes within me […] (van Inwagen, 47)]. Van Inwagen indicates no 
reason why other criterion of personal identity could not be appropriate and work with the 
Aristotelian theory; it seems that he deliberately chose a criterion that is, at first glance, at odds 
with the reconstitution model—a strategic but ultimately fallacious move. To be convincing on 
this key point, van Inwagen must explain why other theories of criterion of personal identity are 
inappropriate or ineffectual. 
 Such other criterions of personal identity might include strict materialism (I am identical 
with my body in its entirety; no more, no less), less strict materialism (I am the “core person”—
the physical brain and central nervous system), or even memory (presumably memories would 
have to be stored in specific physical ways for this to work, so it is still a materialist view. A 
version of this view states that a person who has memories of Person X’s life from Person X’s 
point of view is identical with Person X). Each of these seem to be viable options—at least as 
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viable as van Inwagen’s own criterion. So why not any of these? Van Inwagen must address this 
serious omission. 
 Next, van Inwagen alleges that because of the seriousness of the cannibalism problem, 
the Aristotelian view of resurrection must be faulty. But there are ways to solve the cannibalism 
problem! That is, there are ways in which Sam could eat Alex and yet both of them could be 
resurrected, ensuring that the evildoer does not escape God’s wrath and that the good Christian 
will live again, as promised. 
 For instance, Dean Zimmerman derives from his closest continuer clause—a clause 
which works within van Inwagen’s metaphysics—the no closest predecessor clause: 
[…] if, at present, there exists a certain person who has existed in the past, there must 
have been a closest predecessor of that person; the presence of two equally good prior 
candidates for being the same later person can make a difference as to whether a new 
person has come into existence, rather than a formerly existing person having merely 
continued to exist. (Zimmerman, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, 138) 
 
This means, I think, that the time of death of both organisms matters; if both organisms died and 
fused at the same time, then the new body would be a new organism (and so this body 
reconstituted would be a new organism as well)—this seems highly unlikely, if not impossible; if 
one died and the fusion took place before the other died, then the new (fused) body is identical 
with the last body to die. So in the case of the cannibalism problem, the cannibal (Sam) kills and 
eats the victim (Alex), and then dies. This new, “fused” body—that is, the body that contains 
both Sam and Alex—is really Sam’s (since he died last). So even in death, Sam and Alex are 
distinct, and so will be resurrected separately.  
One might add, too, that the case is not just one of Sam being resurrected with Alex 
becoming a part of him. Instead, Alex himself is also resurrected because God can temporally 
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sort out the bodies/Lives, and does so. In fact, Stephen Davis agrees, claiming that God’s 
omnipotence can sort out who is who (Davis, Death and Afterlife, 133). 
 Not only can the cannibalism problem be solved, but apparently so too can the 
duplication problem that van Inwagen claims eliminates the possibility of the validity of the 
Aristotelian model of resurrection. So, how can we distinguish between the real van Inwagen and 
the duplicate/mere copy? Is the ten-year-old body van Inwagen, or is he the older man?  
For Stephen Davis, his further criteria of personal identity—the will of God—allows us 
to distinguish between the real van Inwagen and the copy (Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense of 
the Resurrection, 120). They don’t both have an equal claim to being van Inwagen because 
there’s the added criterion of God’s will to determine identity, and God will only will that one of 
them is truly van Inwagen. Davis believes, as, intuitively, do I and no doubt many others, that the 
true van Inwagen is the adult. For Davis, this is because the adult has God’s will to be van 
Inwagen; the child is just reconstructed matter, a mere copy. This is also due to the fact that the 
adult van Inwagen has the right kind of material continuity and causal relationship with van 
Inwagen (Davis, Risen Indeed, 117). In other words, 
The adult philosopher has a regular and predictable causal relationship with all previous 
temporal parts of van Inwagen while the child is […] the result of a trick performed by 
God. Surely resurrection has always meant the continuation of the life of the person at the 
psychological stage that that person had reached at death. (Davis, After We Die: 
Theology, Philosophy, and the Question of Life after Death, 55-56) 
 
 We see also with Davis that, despite van Inwagen’s claim to the contrary, going through 
the mind of God does not take away imminent causation! This is because there is no self-
maintenance of objects or people; all things pass through the mind of God anyway. Taken in this 
way, the mind of God can be thought of as the glue of the world. True, Davis agrees with 
Zimmerman that the persistence of an object is partially determined by “the way it was during 
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the interval leading up to that moment” (Davis, After We Die, 70)—but the other necessary part 
of this is God’s will. So this means that God’s reconstructing the bodies of dead persons—the 
Aristotelian model of resurrection—is a possibility. This renders van Inwagen’s model 
superfluous. 
 We see, too, that the simulacrum model itself has issues. The main issue, as we’ll see 
with Zimmerman shortly, is that it makes God seem devious and untrustworthy—an idea 
seriously against Christian doctrine. Further, it is unclear why we should prefer this to the 
Aristotelian model, since we’re able to avoid the problems with it that van Inwagen brings up. In 
fact, it is unclear why we should prefer this to Origen’s theory, or to other theories out there; van 
Inwagen’s criteria for personal identity is undefended and dubious, and his theory seems 
superfluous given the seeming lack of need for a new theory of resurrection. 
Dean Zimmerman 
 In his paper, “The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The ‘Falling Elevator’ 
Model,” Dean Zimmerman critiques van Inwagen’s simulacrum model of resurrection and 
proposes his own “just-so” story instead—one that is compatible with Van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics. As we will see, Zimmerman believes that his falling elevator model avoids the 
problems and contradictions that Van Inwagen’s model falls into. In the end, Zimmerman claims, 
he provides a story that meets the following two requirements: 1) my dead body is really my 
dead body (not a simulacrum), and 2) the resurrected body is really identical with the one I had 
in life (i.e., causally continuous with it). 
 Zimmerman begins his paper by summarizing van Inwagen’s paper in which he proposes 
the simulacrum model of resurrection. As this is a paper which we have already explored in 
depth, I will only point out a few key points here. Both van Inwagen and Zimmerman agree that 
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a criterion of identity for persisting material objects must require direct, immanent causation 
(Zimmerman, 195). Zimmerman also agrees that for a materialist account of resurrection 
compatible with van Inwagen’s metaphysics, we need some way to save the body from the 
destruction of death. 
 So what’s wrong with van Inwagen’s simulacrum model of resurrection? For 
Zimmerman, to start, this account is simply not satisfying: 
[…] it is in some sense possible that God takes our brains when we die and replaces them 
with stuff that looks for all the world like dead brains, just as it is possible that God 
created the world 6000 years ago and put dinosaur bones in the ground to test our faith in 
a slavishly literal reading of Genesis. But neither is particularly satisfying as a picture of 
how God actually does business. (Zimmerman, 196) 
 
In other words, it seems uncharacteristically malignant of God to deceive us, so while it is a 
possibility that this is the case, it seems unlikely that God would act in such a way. Further, as 
we will explore in detail a little later on, Zimmerman asserts that a materialist account like van 
Inwagen’s cannot escape a closest continuer account and must reject the only x and y principle. 
According to Zimmerman, “This is important, since the falling elevator model requires that 
human persistence conditions include a ‘temporally closest continuer’ clause” (Zimmerman, 
196). 
Importantly, Zimmerman asserts that his own model, which we shall get to near the end 
of this section, is compatible with van Inwagen’s metaphysics. But what is his metaphysics? One 
key point is that all that exists are living things and the simples from which they are made. 
Another is that:  
A set of objects are caught up in a Life when they are organized in such a way that they 
work toward insuring the continued existence of successor sets of simples organized in 
roughly the way they are—they possess […] a knack for self-maintenance. (Zimmerman, 
197) 
 




If matter is organized in one of the ways characteristic of living things, it tends to directly 
bring it about that there be matter organized in roughly the same way. A process that only 
indirectly insures that a certain sort of structure be maintained will not count as a single 
Life. (Zimmerman, 197, emphasis in original) 
 
Zimmerman points out that this aspect of van Inwagen’s metaphysics is what makes the 
possibility of survival so problematic for him; once a body dies and therefore no longer 
perpetuates itself,  its demise follows, especially once the living structure has been completely 
lost (e.g. by cremation). 
 We now turn to Zimmerman’s point that van Inwagen’s account leads to important 
contradictions—that is, it leads van Inwagen to claim adherence to the only x and y principle but 
when applied to new examples, Zimmerman shows that this cannot be so (and Zimmerman 
thinks we ought to reject this principle and instead hold a closest continuer theory of personal 
identity instead, which is necessary for his own falling elevator model). 
 The only x and y principle is, in short, 
the thesis that facts about events outside the spatiotemporal path swept out by an object 
could not have made any difference to the question of whether or not a single object 
passed along that path (Zimmerman, 198). 
 
In other words, personal identity cannot depend on anything external to me; the only thing that 
can determine if a thing is me is myself (x) and the future thing (y). This is in contrast to the 
closest continuer theory, which states that at time t+1, I at time t am identical to whatever thing 
most closely resembles me at time t. So the closest continuer theory entails “[…] that whether a 
given process is a single Life will sometimes depend upon events that are not part of that 
process” (Zimmerman, 199). One who accepts the only x and y principle must necessarily reject 
the closest continuer theory; the two are strictly incompatible theories. So by claiming adherence 
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to the only x and y principle, van Inwagen is essentially saying that no external factors can 
dictate whether any person y is identical with any person x. 
 However, Zimmerman will show that in problems of fission, van Inwagen must give up 
the only x and y principle, and in some cases will be forced to adopt a closest continuer theory of 
personal identity. 
 Zimmerman invites us to explore the following case of fission: my brain is split into two, 
and each hemisphere is transplanted into a new body. Both seem to have an equal claim to be 
me, “but they cannot both be me; one thing cannot become two, on pain of contradiction” 
(Zimmerman, 198). So then, which is me? In a similar thought experiment, a creature, 
Neocerberus, has two brains and two sets of organs of maintenance (although because they do 
the same job, Neocerberus requires only one set for functioning). The halves are separated; 
which one is Neocerberus? Zimmerman asserts that van Inwagen would be forced to say “that, at 
least in cases of perfectly symmetrical fission, the original organism ceases to be and is replaced 
by two new ones [Alpha and Beta]” (Zimmerman, 198)—and van Inwagen does say this. 
 This leads naturally to the closest continuer theory since x and y tell us nothing about 
which is Neocerberus; we need further, outside information. But, as Zimmerman points out, the 
closest continuer theory does not necessarily follow from the above thought experiment. For, as 
van Inwagen can and does say, Neocerberus’s life ends when half 1 (or half 2) is destroyed. Van 
Inwagen “could then claim that it is not the mere presence of a competitor that keeps 
Neocerberus’s Life from following the spatiotemporal path traced out by Alpha (or Beta),” 
(Zimmerman, 200). 
 The competition mentioned here is, I believe, the competition between half 1 and half 2 
over who is Neocerberus in actuality. But since one of the halves dies in this variation of the 
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thought experiment, there’s no competition; there is only one organism left to claim the title of 
Neocerberus. However, despite the lack of competition, this organism is not Neocerberus, since 
Neocerberus required two halves with two sets (total) of organs of maintenance, not one; instead 
of being Neocerberus, the surviving organism is Alpha (or Beta). 
Breaking this down further, we see that this is because while the organism that was 
Neocerberus required only one set of organs for functioning, Neocerberus’s Life & therefore 
personal identity was caused by two organs of maintenance, not one. And, for van Inwagen, it is 
the cause of a Life that determines what constitutes that Life’s personal identity. So when you 
destroy the Beta organs, there is still life because there are the Alpha organs and you only need 
one set for a life, but this is a different Life than Neocerberus’s because it is caused only by 
Alpha organs, and so is Alpha, not Neocerberus. 
Van Inwagen is forced to accept a closest continuer theory, though, when considering the 
thought experiment of Leftycerberus, a creature very much like Neocerberus except that the left 
organs of maintenance are a bit faster than the right organs of maintenance in sending signals 
that direct that life. And, in the case of Leftycerberus, sometimes the signals do not send, so in 
these cases Leftycerberus relies on the right organs of maintenance for life. Yet, 
To be consistent with what he says about Neocerberus, it would seem that he must say 
something like this: whenever one organ of maintenance is, for a time, the sole cause of 
the changes it tries to direct, then it cannot give up any of its control to the other organ of 
maintenance without one Life coming to an end and a new one beginning. (Zimmerman, 
200) 
 
But this would be a ridiculous claim, implies Zimmerman. After all, imagine Henry, a man who 
at some point in his life requires a pacemaker. We would certainly be reasonable in claiming that 
pre- and post-pacemaker Henry is the same Henry! Why should Leftycerberus be any different?  
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Zimmerman claims that van Inwagen must admit that Leftycerberus could survive the 
removal/destruction of one of its organs of maintenance (this is not true fission, since the rest of 
Leftycerberus remains intact). For example, let’s say that the left side transfers its duties to the 
right side, and is then removed. Leftycerberus’s pre-op and post-op Life is the same (Life 1), 
since it has the same cause (which is VI’s criteria/stipulation): the right side’s organs of 
maintenance. 
But in a case of true fission, Leftycerberus does not survive. This is because a competitor 
(the other half that becomes a new organism) is present. So, according to van Inwagen’s 
metaphysics, it follows that Life 1 ends and two new Lives begin. So we see that van Inwagen 
therefore must give up the only x and y principle, since Leftycerberus’s survival depends on the 
presence or absence of a competitor. A closest continuer theory of personal identity must be 
adopted. 
As we will see, Zimmerman’s falling elevator model implies that the only x and y 
principle be false, so “if van Inwagen’s materialism should force him to reject the principle 
anyway, the falling elevator model does not have this implication as an added cost” 
(Zimmerman, 198). Zimmerman himself advocates for a “‘temporally-closest continuer’ theory 
of persistence conditions” (Zimmerman, 201):  
If you are looking for the next event in a given Life, and the present event is causally  
connected in the appropriate, immanent way to two nonsimultaneous later events, but one  
is earlier than the other, go to the earlier of the two—it is the earlier one that represents  
the continuation of this Life, and the subsequent appearance of the later one does not turn  
this into a case of fission. (Zimmerman, 201) 
Thus ends Zimmerman’s critique of the simulacrum theory of resurrection, and marks the 
beginning of the presentation of his own “just-so” story. 
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 But before Zimmerman can present the rest of his theory, he must first outline the 
possibility of lives with spatiotemporal gaps. For Zimmerman, it is not spatiotemporal contiguity 
that matters for a thing’s persistence, but rather immanent causality (this too is in line with van 
Inwagen’s metaphysics). Importantly,  
[…] for an object that persists throughout a given period of time, the way the object is at 
any moment in that interval must be partially determined by the way it was during the 
interval leading up to that moment. (Zimmerman, 203) 
 
It doesn’t matter then, if b follows a immediately or if there is a spatiotemporal gap between 
them; what matters is that a and b are connected through immanent causation; something about a 
causes b; when b appears is not significant. In Zimmerman’s own words, 
[…] immanent-causal relations among stages are much more central to the persistence 
conditions of physical objects than relations of spatiotemporal contiguity among stages. 
Furthermore, the notion that spatiotemporal continuity of stages is not even necessary for 
persistence is a natural enough view. Why suppose that things cannot jump 
discontinuously from one place to another, or flicker out of existence for a while only to 
re-emerge elsewhere and elsewhen? (Zimmerman, 203) 
 
In fact, for Zimmerman, spaiotemporal continuity seems to be a result or sign of immanent 
causation, rather than the other way around. So we begin to see the possibility of “gappy” 
objects—that is, objects that can persist across spatiotemporal gaps. 
 Importantly,  
[immanent causality] does not rule out the possibility of discontinuous spatiotemporal 
jumps for objects, or even of ‘temporally gappy’ objects; it merely describes a condition 
that applies to periods of time throughout which an object exists. If immanent-causal 
connections are indeed necessary for persistence, then if it is possible for an object to 
persist through temporal gaps during which it has no stages, there must be suitable 
immanent-causal relations which cross the temporal gap between earlier and later stages. 
(Zimmerman, 203, emphasis in original) 
 
In these cases of gappy existence, it is a necessary condition of x’s persistence over a gap that x’s 
temporal stage right before the moment the gap begins is a partial cause of x’s temporal stage 
right after the moment the gap ends. Further, “[…] at no time during the gap is there a set of 
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conditions sufficient by itself for the occurrence of x’s temporal stage [right after the moment the 
gap ends]” (Zimmerman, 203). For if there was, then it would follow that immanent-causal 
connections could pass through the mind of God—a feat that van Inwagen classifies as not 
immanent enough to count. 
As has already been touched upon, there is no reason to think that a Life could not 
contain spatial jumps or temporal gaps. For “as long as the causal processes from earlier stages 
to later stages are of the right sort, preserving the self-sustaining structure peculiar to the living 
thing in question, one has the same Life” (Zimmerman, 204). So in this case too, it is the 
immanent causation of one stage to the next that matters, not the spatiotemporal continuity of 
stages. 
 In fact, Zimmerman asserts, there is some reason to think that persistence across 
spatiotemporal gaps happens; “the most promising theories still in the water can accommodate 
it” (Zimmerman, 204). For instance, 
[…] Bell’s inequality […] suggests that either there is faster-than-light signaling at the 
quantum level, or else there are nonlocal causal influences at work. […] nonlocal causal 
processes are a serious contender for explaining certain very mysterious physical 
phenomena; and many of those who have thought hardest about these matters take the 
possibility seriously. (Zimmerman, 204) 
 
In regards to the most promising theories still in the water, the impossibility of causation over 
gaps doesn’t follow from them. They don’t “in any straightforward way imply the spatiotemporal 
continuity of causal processes, or the contiguity of cause and effect” (Zimmerman, 205, 
emphasis in original). So, it seems to Zimmerman, it is not too much of a stretch to seriously 
consider the possibility that Lives can persist over spatiotemporal gaps. 
 With this groundwork laid out, Zimmerman then presents his falling elevator model of 
resurrection. In this model, my body undergoes discontinuous fission by the hand of God, 
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producing two copies at disparate spatiotemporal locations. One copy is exact, with all particles 
arranged exactly as the original was, and because the original was (there is immanent causation); 
there is replication over a temporal gap. This first copy appears in Heaven, now or in the future. 
The other copy is flawed, and is basically just dead, unstructured matter that looks like the 
original, but which doesn’t have all the particles in all the right places and so is not an exact 
copy. This imperfection allows the one Life (of the first, exact copy) to continue in the future; 
since the fission is imperfect, there’s no true duplication problem. In other words, there is no 
issue of competition, so the Life does not necessarily end. This second, imperfect copy appears 
right where the original was, and is what we refer to as the “corpse.” However, it is important to 
note that this corpse is not a candidate for being me—although it is a causally connected copy—
since it does not participate in a Life (Zimmerman, 206).  
 The falling elevator model still works even if the simples of which we’re composed can 
last through time (meaning, I think, that instead of the original simples disappearing/ending and 
being replaced by two different copies, one of which continues the Life and one of which is the 
“dead” copy, the corpse actually is the mass of the very same simples that used to be alive—
these particles remain x particles, though they are dead. Instead of having two separate copies 
with the original ceasing to exist, in the case of simples that can last through time, the original 
stays, and the particles in the hereafter are different, though causally immanent with the x 
particles). In this case,  
[…] each particle x is immanent-causally connected to two streams of later particle-
stages; one of them—the one in the here and now—includes stages of x itself; the other, 
the one in the hereafter, consists of stages of a different particle. (Zimmerman, 206) 
 
In other words, the fission products don’t coexist; there’s only one resultant particle now, so we 
do not face the issue of competition (there’s only one temporally-closest continuer). 
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 But what makes the first, exact copy the same body as the original, that is, what makes it 
my body? Simply that it partakes in the same Life. Against Aristotle’s theory of reconstitution, 
for Zimmerman personal identity is not about particular particles of matter. After all, the 
particles that make up our bodies are always being replaced anyway. So what makes the exact 
copy of my body mine is the same principle that makes my adult body the same as my baby 
body: it partakes in one and the same Life. 
 And “whether or not the ultimate simples in my body persist, the atoms and molecules in 
my body as I die will all still be here, heaped up on the floor as parts of my corpse” 
(Zimmerman, 206). In other words, the second imperfect copy of the original is still my corpse 
although it was not and never will be me. There is no competitor, because what would be the 
competitor (the perfect first copy of the original) is in the future, whereas my corpse is in the 
present; competition is not an issue and immanent causality is present, so it’s still my corpse. 
After all, “the causal relations normally sufficient to preserve atoms and molecules will obtain 
between the pre- and post-death atoms and molecules” (Zimmerman, 206). This means, I think, 
that it’s the same body, my body, because its atoms and molecules at time t are causally 
connected to those at time t*. If the simples in my body persist, then it is my body because it 
partakes in the same Life as the original. And if the simples in my body don’t persist but are 
replaced, then this is still my body because the copies are causally connected—even the 
imperfect dead copy. It is still a copy because it was caused by the original, even if it is deficient! 
Thus concludes Zimmerman’s paper. 
Questions for Zimmerman 
 I find Zimmerman’s theory highly convincing as a “just-so” story. He puts forth a theory 
of personal identity that not only explains how one might survive death, but also explains how I 
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am the same person I was yesterday, or last week, or ten years ago. I find this to be a major 
strength of his paper. However, I do find problems with how he reached the need for his just-so 
story; the steps taken to introduce it seem faulty. 
 The first major faults I find in Zimmerman’s paper have to do with his basing important 
aspects of his theory on things he believes to be intuitively obvious and therefore true. For 
instance, he claims, based on his intuition, that pre- and post-pacemaker Henry must be the same 
person. This does not seem obvious to me—and if we can disagree about the truth of an intuition, 
then it seems that intuitions by nature are too weak to support a theory or statement alone. After 
all, in this example, why couldn’t we stick to van Inwagen’s principle and declare pre- and post-
pacemaker Henry different people? Van Inwagen’s account makes just as much sense to me as 
does the alternative. And even if it were intuitive that they are the same person, one must take 
into account the fact that many intuitions have been proven wrong throughout history. For 
example, it is intuitively obvious that the Earth is flat and that the heavier an object, the faster it 
will fall—but we know now, after deeper examination, that both of these intuitive beliefs are 
blatantly, objectively false.  
And yes, we originally had reason to believe that these false intuitions were true—
reasons that have since been replaced with explanations for why the intuition is false yet seemed 
true. And yes, there have also been intuitions that have later been proven to be correct. But just 
because the same has yet to be said for the intuition that pre- and post-pacemaker Henry must be 
the same person does not mean that it will not ever be said. Further, Zimmerman has not proven 
that his intuitions are correct—and proof requires more than intuition alone. I put forward here 
the idea that all intuitions, while perhaps helpful in our day-to-day life, are not necessarily to be 
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accepted as truth at face value. Yet Zimmerman does not here supply more than an intuition in 
this key step of his paper. I find this to be problematic. 
 So if we consider that Zimmerman’s intuitions may be wrong (they certainly lack proof), 
it seems that in fact van Inwagen can be consistent about what he says about Leftycerberus, and 
therefore can avoid being forced into a closer continuer theory. In other words, it may be true 
that whenever one organ of maintenance takes over from the other organ of maintenance 
previously directing change in that organism’s body, a new Life begins. This would certainly be 
complicated and troubling, but that is not to say that it is impossible. So, then, we see that 
accepting a closest continuer theory does become an extra burden to carry for those who accept 
Zimmerman’s theory of resurrection. However, we must acknowledge here that while possible, 
the idea that a new Life begins whenever one organ of maintenance takes over from the other is 
extremely implausible. So my objection is weakened, and Zimmerman’s point here is salvaged 
on the count of implausibility.  
 Another problem with Zimmerman’s paper is that he does not provide a convincing 
argument for the possibility of the existence of objects with spatiotemporally gappy existence. 
True, the concept of gappy objects makes sense with the scientific theory he indicates (Bell’s 
inequality), but that theory is just a theory, which will likely (as history has shown) be disproven 
by other, future theories. Further, as this is a counter-intuitive claim, it requires substantiation, 
which is glaringly absent. Finally, just because the impossibility of gappy existence doesn’t 
follow from the “most promising theories still in the water” (Zimmerman, 205) does not mean 
that the possibility of gappy existence follows, either. It is just a possibility either way, but there 
is no reason to think that it’s the way Zimmerman wants to say it is. In fact, it probably is not, 




 After examining various answers to the question of the compatibility with materialism 
and bodily resurrection within Christian doctrine, I am led to conclude that the two are 
compatible in at least some scenarios. Although each of the solutions examined here has its own 
problems, I am drawn to Origen’s solution as the most viable of the lot. 
 I began this paper by indicating that in order to be deemed compatible with materialism, 
an account of the bodily resurrection must meet certain requirements. It must contain an account 
of criterion of personal identity that allows the retention of personal identity through the 
destructive transformation of death. Further, the selfsame body that we have in this life must be 
the one that undergoes a spiritual yet physical transformation and is resurrected, transformed. 
Finally, a convincing account must either avoid or confront the problems of cannibalism and 
duplication discussed earlier in this paper. 
 The Aristotelian view of resurrection was introduced via the introduction of the problems 
of cannibalism and fission/annihilation. But as we saw in the van Inwagen section of this thesis, 
there are convincing ways to avoid at least the cannibalism and duplication problems. So I 
conclude that though the Aristotelian theory of reconstruction is not fully developed in certain 
key areas (such as the criterion of personal identity, which Aristotle fallaciously equated with 
matter), this theory—given some supplementary development—seems like a quite feasible way 
to solve the problem of the compatibility of materialism and the bodily resurrection. 
 With Origen, we saw that the criterion of personal identity is one’s eidos (material form 
with inherent organization and potential for growth, a bit like a genetic code). What Methodius 
saw as a deficit in Origen’s account—his sacrifice of material continuity and bodily structure for 
identity over change and transformation—I see as strengths in line with our understanding of the 
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world today. Some minor problems with Origen’s account include that it is unclear what our 
bodies will look like in the afterlife. At what age will we be represented in the resurrection? Will 
externally-imposed physical changes will be represented? Origen declares that we’ll lose our 
memories, yet this seems important to our sense of personal identity. These details must be 
cleaned up through a modern lens, but it should not be difficult to do so. 
 We must also acknowledge that Origen did not directly address the problems of 
cannibalism, fission/annihilation, and duplication. Still, Davis’s solution to the first and last of 
these problems is compatible with Origen’s account. As in the other accounts, the issue of 
fission/annihilation remains problematic.  
 Next, we explored van Inwagen’s simulacrum model of resurrection, which he offers in 
place of the Aristotelian theory of reconstitution. Van Inwagen’s criterion of personal identity is 
that atoms hold their positions because of the operations of processes within a person that, 
together, constitutes that person’s being alive. However, van Inwagen does not defend why his 
criterion of personal identity is best or most appropriate. And his criterion is against the 
reconstruction view because in that view, the particles are where they are because of God. We 
see also that van Inwagen leveled accusations against the Aristotelian model; that is, he claimed 
that the cannibalism and duplication problems could not be solved within the framework of 
Aristotle’s metaphysics of afterlife. However, we also saw that not only can we solve the 
cannibalism and duplication problems under this framework, but it also seems that one can go 
through the mind of God and still have immanent causation. So it seems that the Aristotelian 
model is a possibility on these counts and therefore that van Inwagen’s account is superfluous. 
Finally, the simulacrum model has the final flaw of making God seem devious and 
untrustworthy—qualities of God that go strictly against Christian doctrine. 
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 Finally, we turned to Zimmerman’s falling elevator model of resurrection. As 
Zimmerman uses van Inwagen’s metaphysics, they share the same criterion of personal identity. 
Zimmerman also shows that van Inwagen’s model leads to a contradiction: while van Inwagen 
claims adherence to the only x and y principle, in reality he is forced into a closest continuer 
theory. Importantly, what determines a Life is the cause of that Life—there is a temporally-
closest continuer clause here, as well. Zimmerman also claims that immanent causality is more 
important than is spatiotemporal continuity, and that, accordingly, the idea of spatiotemporally 
gappy existence is possible. He then introduces the falling elevator model in which the 
duplication problem is avoided by imperfect fission. I find his account convincing as a “just-so” 
story, but am skeptical as to how he reached this story. He bases too much on intuition, and in 
fact we find that accepting a closest continuer theory is an extra cost of his account. So, while 
convincing, Zimmerman’s theory does have its drawbacks. 
 It seems, then, that while most of the accounts explored here either avoided or 
successfully confronted the problems of cannibalism and duplication, all still must face the 
problem of fission/annihilation outlined early on in this thesis. As the science necessary for 
exploring and better understanding this problem is not yet fully developed, I leave this problem 
to future philosophers. Assuming this problem of fission/annihilation can be solved or exploded, 
then, I am convinced that the concepts of materialism and of bodily resurrection within a 
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